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Summary  
One of the reasons that makes the position of the judiciary valuable is the issue of the 
implementation of Islamic justice, which we can only achieve by having fair judges with the 
condition of judicial independence; And this issue is one of the important goals of this research 
and is of special importance in the current era; And it doubles the need for our attention and 
research. According to the subject of the research, the method of collecting materials is 
documentary and library method in such a way that first the desired sources are studied and where 
necessary, research is done on the material. The research method is descriptive-analytical. First, 
the required resources are selected from electronic libraries, articles and dissertations, and after 
studying and separating the required material, based on the inductive method, analytical and 
necessary filing of the required resources is completed and compiled. This research tries to answer 
the question: what is the jurisprudential and legal study of the independence, science and ijtihad 
of judges? And what are the legal jurisprudential bases of judges' independence? What we have 
reached about the nature of the judge's knowledge in this study is that the expressions in Articles 
211 and 212 of the Islamic Penal Code of 1392 indicate that from the legislative point of view, 
what is the basis for producing knowledge for the judge is evidence and the UAE typically The 
science is the result of judicial research. Also, the results of the research showed that the 
expressions in Articles 211 and 212 of the Islamic Penal Code of 1392 indicate that from the 
legislator's point of view, what is the basis for producing knowledge for the judge is evidence and 
the UAE is typically knowledgeable as a result of judicial investigation. In the current laws and 
procedures of the judiciary, the mujtahid of a judge is not considered a necessary condition for 
holding the position of judge. 
Keywords: authority and power of the judge, knowledge and independence of judges, ijtihad and 
knowledge of the judge, judgment in jurisprudence, judgment in law. 
Resumen 
Una de las razones que hace valiosa la posición del poder judicial es el tema de la implementación 
de la justicia islámica, que solo podemos lograr con jueces justos con la condición de 
independencia judicial; Y este tema es uno de los objetivos importantes de esta investigación y es 
de especial importancia en la era actual; Y duplica la necesidad de nuestra atención e 
investigación. Según el tema de la investigación, el método de recolección de materiales es el 
método documental y bibliotecario de tal manera que primero se estudian las fuentes deseadas y, 
en caso necesario, se investiga el material. El método de investigación es descriptivo-analítico. 
Primero, se seleccionan los recursos requeridos de bibliotecas electrónicas, artículos y 
disertaciones, y luego de estudiar y separar el material requerido, con base en el método inductivo, 
se completa y compila el archivo analítico y necesario de los recursos requeridos. Esta 
investigación intenta dar respuesta a la pregunta: ¿qué es el estudio jurisprudencial y jurídico de 
la independencia, ciencia e ijtihad de los jueces? ¿Y cuáles son las bases jurídicas 
jurisprudenciales de la independencia de los jueces? Lo que hemos llegado sobre la naturaleza del 
conocimiento del juez en este estudio es que las expresiones de los artículos 211 y 212 del Código 
Penal Islámico de 1392 indican que desde el punto de vista legislativo, cuál es la base para 
producir conocimiento para el juez es La evidencia y los EAU típicamente La ciencia es el 
resultado de la investigación judicial. Además, los resultados de la investigación mostraron que 
las expresiones en los artículos 211 y 212 del Código Penal Islámico de 1392 indican que, desde 
el punto de vista del legislador, lo que es la base para producir conocimiento para el juez es la 
evidencia y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos típicamente están informados. como resultado de una 
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investigación judicial. En las leyes y procedimientos actuales del poder judicial, el mujtahid de 
un juez no se considera una condición necesaria para ocupar el cargo de juez. 
Palabras clave: autoridad y poder del juez, conocimiento e independencia de los jueces, ijtihad y 
conocimiento del juez, juicio en jurisprudencia, juicio en derecho. 
 
Introduction 
For many, the question may arise as to whether the judge should be independent or not, and 
whether the judge's knowledge should be limited to ijtihad. If ijtihad is necessary for the judge, 
then how is the urgent need for a judge and the absence of a mujtahid eliminated in the courts? 
And what are the evidences and bases that distinguish an independent judge and a mujtahid? 
Today, due to the wide range of judicial needs for judges, it has provided the ground for authorized 
judges or consolidation in this system to be able to issue a fair verdict using judicial evidence, 
relevant experts and mujtahid fatwas and advice as needed. This article also seeks to address the 
principle of judicial independence that every judge should have in order to be able to make a fair 
judgment without any reluctance or power; And considering that independence is very important 
for the judge and the judiciary, it has made this research necessary, so in the definition of a judge 
it is said that a judge is actually someone who has all these characteristics and whoever is a judge 
should He has the necessary conditions to become a mujtahid or a mufti and a jurist, but the 
opposite is not true, that is, a jurist, a mujtahid and a mufti do not have to meet all the conditions 
that a judge must have. (Al-Sherbini Khatib, Mohammad, Mughni Al-Muhtaj to know the 
meanings of the words Al-Minhaj. Vol. 
It has also been said: "Judging is permissible and sometimes obligatory among Muslims, and if 
the conditions for the obligation to judge are not met, that is, there are several judges who have 
the capacity to judge, it is mustahab." "Judgment is sufficient for those who qualify for such a 
position." (Hali, Ibn Idris, Muhammad ibn Mansour ibn Ahmad. Al-Sarair al-Hawi for writing 
the fatwas. Vol. 2, p. 152). 
Judicial independence is more important than other conditions because it is the supreme of all 
conditions of judgment and the realization of divine justice; And all the conditions pursue a 
common goal, namely the guarantee of the rights of the people and the establishment of social 
justice, which are not achieved by independence and impartiality in judgment. Therefore, in this 
article, we seek a detailed study of the subject of research "Legal jurisprudence of the 
independence and impartiality of judges" from different perspectives (Islamic law, jurisprudence, 
law and law) with a common goal between them (achieving justice and establishing the 
impartiality of judges). 
Therefore, we briefly state that the independence of judges does not mean arbitrariness and lack 
of consultation and use of valid jurisprudential arguments, but the opposite is the case. It has been 
narrated from the Holy Prophet (PBUH) that he said about the use of the knowledge of others: 
The wisest people are those who gather the knowledge of all people with their knowledge. (Qomi, 
Saduq, Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Babawiyyah. Amali. P. 13). 
Also, the independence of the judge does not mean ijtihad to vote; Because this kind of thinking, 
according to the Sunnis, is the same as legislating and legislating the law; That is, the mujtahid 
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should make a ruling that is not in the book and tradition with his own thoughts and opinions. 
This is called "vote ijtihad". This type of ijtihad is forbidden by the Shiites. Therefore, 
independence can be considered based on the current situation, including three issues: 
1- Independence in not influencing or influencing the power of third parties and even threatening 
the judiciary. 
2- Independence in not threatening the judge with the verdict issued and observing equality or 
observing all the rulings related to judging the rights of the parties. 
3- Independence in the inner state of the judge, which includes nervous disorders, increased 
working hours, physical and mental illnesses, etc., which cause disorders in the judgment. 
Therefore, the judiciary is an independent power and the meaning of its independence is that if a 
ruling is issued by judges, no one, not even a mujtahid, has the right to violate or interfere in it, 
and no one has the right to interfere in the judiciary, and interfering is against the sharia and 
prevention. The verdict of the judges is also against the Sharia; And judicial independence means 
that if a verdict is issued, that verdict will probably be upheld It has a reference and no one else 
has the right to interfere. 
 Finally, judging without the independence of judges and observing equality and realizing the 
right and not paying attention to arbitrariness and false analogy, does not make sense and 
independence can not be separated from the judiciary and create any kind of disruption in the 
judiciary, ie removing the sharia and legal rights of individuals. Considering that this has no place 
in Islamic judgment. Therefore, in this study, we discuss the issue of independence from the 
perspective of Sharia (book, tradition, consensus and reason) and most of the famous and expert 
jurists such as Sheikh Ansari, Sahib Jawaher, the late Karaki, the late Mohaghegh, the late Ameli 
and Allameh and the late Imam Khomeini, jurists Contemporary. We will explain the title and 
finally the dependence of laws and legal views on the goals and interpretations of Islamic law in 
detail. 
Of course, the late Ameli Karki quotes about the justice of judges that the famous jurisprudential 
saying is the obligation to observe equality in these matters; And this obligation is going on 
between the lawyers of the parties. (Ameli Karaki. Ali Ibn Hussein. Rasael Mohaghegh Karaki. 
Volume 3. p. 89). 
Some also believe that it is not necessary to observe the settlement of the parties in the heart 
desire. (Kashf al-Latham wa al-Baham on the rules of rulings. Volume 10. p. 479. And some, 
such as Sheikh Ansari, believe that it is makrooh for a judge to pay attention (too kindly) to one 
of the parties. (Sheikh Ansari. Al-Qada fi al-Shahadat. P. 114) It is imperative that judges always 
be strong in their independent thinking and will, and in their position and decisions, and have 
equal power over the parties, and not be influenced by any of the political and economic powers. 
The extraordinary importance of the independence and impartiality of judges and its sensitive 
position in the Islamic system; which in this study, while examining the historical course of 
judging in different societies until the mission of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) based on Islamic 
jurisprudential arguments or even religions Different and Qur'anic views on the status, 
independence and impartiality of judges are discussed and in this regard, while explaining the 
concept, dimensions and principles of the principle and providing a correct reading of it, to explain 
its jurisprudential position, the conditions and obstacles to its realization in the Iranian judicial 
system Let us examine whether the principle of independence and impartiality of judges in the 
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Islamic government is in accordance with the Islamic Sharia discussed in this article. This 
question will be specified at the end of the research. 
Background research 
In an analysis conducted by Amiri (2013) entitled "The Importance of Judgment and 
Independence of Judges in Islamic Law" it is pointed out that judicial independence, which today 
is one of the roots of constitutional rights and independence of powers in the constitution of 
modern countries. It is known to have a historical connection with Islamic law. The basis of 
judging in Islam goes back to the two elements of authority and responsibility. Judges in the early 
days of Islam had special powers, which was complete independence, and no authority, not even 
the caliphs, had the right to interfere in the judiciary. 
Movahedi Moheb (2009) in a study entitled "Judge ijtihad in the Iranian judicial system" 
concluded that ijtihad is an undeniable virtue in line with the goals of the Islamic legal system 
and the constitution, and non-mujtahid judges must be supported by Islamic jurisprudence and 
principles of Islamic law. The current judicial system and laws are well known. 
In an analysis conducted by Kalantari and Salmanpour (2017) entitled "The place of the judge's 
knowledge in proving the criminal case in Iranian law", researchers concluded that the sensory 
documents of the judge issuing the sentence can not be considered typically scientific. The 
knowledge of the judge must be based on documents that are typically scientific and of the kind 
of examples mentioned in the note below Article 211 of the said law. 
Heidari (2014) in a study entitled The validity of the judge's knowledge in issuing criminal 
sentences in the Islamic Penal Code adopted in 1392 states that a review of the articles of the 1392 
law shows that the knowledge and persuasion of the judge in this law is placed along with other 
evidence And is considered a criterion for proving a criminal case. Although this issue has a 
history in ta'zir, but it is considered as an innovation of the criminal legislator within the limits 
and retribution, so that the legislator in these crimes can act on legal grounds, provided that the 
judge does not have the knowledge to the contrary. ¬ Acceptable. Although from the 
jurisprudential point of view, the judge should be a mujtahid, but in the current situation and the 
lack of a mujtahid for this position and on the other hand, the society urgently needs a judge, so 
with the permission of the supreme leader who is the general deputy of Imam (AS), people with 
the necessary arrangements and judicial instructions. Officials are appointed as authorized and 
consolidated judges. 
  Limitations of judicial independence 
As stated, judges in decision-making must be protected from the undue influence and interference 
of incompetent forces and forces; Whether from the direct involvement of the political and 
executive forces of the country or the indirect involvement of public opinion and mass media. In 
Islamic law, jurists are of the opinion that the judge can act on his knowledge in cases where he 
has knowledge of the accuracy and rightness of his claim (Sangalji, 2001: 141); Therefore, in the 
past, when there was no new judiciary, science-based voting was acceptable in our country. Of 
course, this issue has led some Western jurists to believe that the issuance of a verdict by a Muslim 
judge is based only on his knowledge and he has absolute authority to carry out his demands 
(Alizadeh, 2008: 107). It should be noted here that in addition to the fact that jurists consider only 
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knowledge of the subject as a condition for citing the knowledge of a judge, the commentary to 
Article 3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, which is an unprecedented provision in our law, 
clarifies at least the legal provisions: 
"If the judge is a mujtahid and finds the law to be against the law, the case will be referred to 
another branch for investigation." Therefore, he cannot rely on science that is against the law. In 
addition, one of the conditions of a judge in jurisprudence is justice. Justice in this position means 
correct orientation, trustworthiness, chastity with incest and security. 
To fear oneself is from pleasure and anger (Alieh, 1406: 49); These cases themselves can be 
conditions for guaranteeing the right trial. Therefore, a judge cannot issue a verdict under the 
pretext of independence, creativity, or intuitive arguments, contrary to the rule of law and certain 
legal principles such as the principle of innocence. In other words, his independence is valid to 
the extent that it does not become a means of violating the rules and principles of law as well as 
individual rights, otherwise, in addition to violating the sentence in higher authorities, it leads to 
disciplinary action and even in some cases, criminal prosecution or civil liability. 
It may be argued that the judge, due to his independence, is not required to follow the judicial 
procedure, except in special cases (Farkman and Vegrish, 2003: 159); But ensuring the equality 
of individuals before the judiciary governs the judge's adherence to judicial procedure and limits 
his or her full independence; Because a completely independent court makes regular social 
behavior and economic activities of society impossible. If the outcome of any case is only the 
judge's understanding and conflicts with the decision of other cases involving similar issues, 
citizens do not want and can not go to court (Burbank, 2003: 326); Therefore, judicial 
independence is not absolute; That is, the courts may not, as they deem appropriate, issue a 
judgment, whether external or internal, potential or actual. Human beings are selfish and corrupt, 
and even the moral standards of individuals are variable, so you must think of a way to monitor 
the judicial process and determine the limits of independence. The principle of accountability is 
one of the methods of limiting the absolute independence of the judge and means responsibility 
for the state or quality of judicial behavior that has deviated from conventional standards (Foster, 
2006: 98). Independence and judicial responsibility are complementary concepts that can and 
should be combined. In other words, they are two sides of the same coin, so that the responsible 
judiciary, which has no independence, is weak and powerless, and the independent judiciary, 
which has no responsibility, is very dangerous (Burbank, 2003: 325). In general, those who have 
the will and are the source of the decision should be held accountable; If the judge does not have 
independence, holding him accountable for his actions and decisions is against justice. Also, the 
accountability and responsibility of the judge is a democratic principle (Federico, 1998: 373). 
This means that the judge, while independent and dealing with the judiciary, must be accountable 
to the people who own the government and the country; But it is important to know which 
authority oversees the actions and conduct of judges. The general principle is that the appointing 
authority of judges is the most competent authority to oversee the actions and conduct of judges. 
Of course, some jurists oppose the judge's liability for minor errors. As the responsibility arising 
from the fault of the judge according to Article 171 of the Constitution is considered incompatible 
with the necessities of this important job if the fault is taken in its usual meaning (Katozian, 1387: 
389). This view is correct in that the interveners in the independence of the judge may allow this 
intervention to cover his responsibility; Because the independence of the judge is mostly 
threatened by the officials who supervise the work of the judge. Therefore, in order to solve this 
problem, the authority to investigate judges' violations must be independent and within the justice 
system, that is, it must be a judicial authority and its members must consist of judges rather than 
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executive authorities; Because it does not make sense for people who do not have independence 
themselves and do not have job security to be the reference for investigating a judge's error; In 
this case, the executive can be a means of suspending and dismissing the judge. Also, in principle, 
accusing and dismissing judges should not be a reaction to the content of their judicial decisions; 
But only for its legal purpose (Burbank, 2003: 329). 
For this reason, the Human Rights Commission rejects its concern about the dismissal of two 
judges by the President of a country in order to prevent the interference of the executive branch 
and declares: UN, 149). Article 17 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
states in the Charter that "any charge or claim made against a judge concerning his or her 
jurisdiction or profession shall be subject to the same fair trial as an independent tribunal." 
In addition, according to Article 42 of the bill amending part of the Law on the Principles of the 
Organization of Judiciary and the Employment of Judges, it is not possible to prosecute a judge 
before he is suspended by the Supreme Disciplinary Court. Because a judge without immunity 
from prosecution has no job immunity and his independence is easily violated. In any case, a 
single institution with the same standard should deal with judicial violations. The existence of 
similar and parallel institutions, which can permanently remove the judge from service and their 
verdict is final in some cases, is against judicial independence (Shams, 1387: 173). Thus, in a 
judiciary whose judges are so easily disqualified, the concept of judicial independence is severely 
distorted. 
The concept of judges' knowledge in jurisprudential and legal terms 
Science means knowing and being aware of the nature of events and phenomena in the 
environment. From the point of view of logic, it is a quality science that is created by combining 
the current single feeling with the previous feelings in the human mind. This quality and manner 
is called perception or awareness, or the result of a foreign object in the mind, which has also 
been interpreted as cognition and science (Mojtaba, 1987: 20). 
Science in jurisprudential terms means certainty and certainty, which is also called ordinary 
science (Jafari Langroudi, 1367: 4/563). In this regard, Allama Hali has said in the commentary 
of the Mu'tam'in: (Hali, 1411: 697) and also Imam Khomeini have said in Tahrir al-Wasilah: 
(Khomeini, 1366: 539). In the principles of jurisprudence, the science of cutting is the opposite 
of suspicion, and its truth is nothing but the development of reality and the truth as a whole. It 
should be noted that cessation is a state of mind in which something is known to a person and is 
opposed to suspicion, doubt and possibility. In other words, it is a dogmatic cut in which the 
possibility of error and wrongdoing is not given (Bayhaqi, Bita: 106). Of course, in jurisprudence 
and law, reaching this knowledge in which no unknown remains is not meant, but it is an ordinary 
and conventional science that is used in law as a means of resolving and resolving disputes (Ahani, 
1381: 38). 
In judicial issues, two types of science come to mind: first, it is a science that has stated the rules 
and regulations and discusses the duties and responsibilities of individuals, and second, it is the 
judge's knowledge of the disputed subject and the disputed reality. It is possible for this 
knowledge to be obtained as a result of experiences and study of sciences, etc. with a series of 
conclusions or through the study of the case and the explanations and arguments of the parties for 
the judge. Which is basically the proof of a claim from the manifestations of ordinary science. In 
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order to clarify this issue, ordinary or certain science and personal or acquired science are 
explained below: 
 Ordinary or certain science 
Personal or product knowledge 
Regarding the knowledge of the judge, there are four sayings among Shiite jurists: 
- The authority of the judge's knowledge only in the rights of the people 
- The authority of the judge's knowledge only in the rights of God 
- The absolute authority of the judge, which is a well-known opinion. 
Lack of absolute authority of the knowledge of the judge, which is the opinion of Ibn Junaid. 
The validity of the judge's knowledge 
Most jurists agree on the validity of the knowledge of the judge, but disagree on the extent of 
influence and its subjects and conditions. From this perspective, different statements are examined 
in this regard: 
1. Credit in the right of the people 
2. Credibility in the right of God 
3. Absolute validity 
4. Validity in injury and adjustment 
The positive value of the judge's knowledge in jurisprudence and law 
The positive value of the knowledge of the judge in criminal jurisprudence has always been 
discussed and disputed among jurists. Some Sunni jurists (Novi, 1412: 8/140; Sharbini, 1415: 
4/399) and most Shiite jurists (Alam al-Huda, 1415: 487; Rashti, 1401: 91) with reference to some 
verses and hadiths that are often They are in charge of financial and human rights claims, they 
consider the knowledge of the judge to be valid and of positive value; Although they differ in the 
degree of influence, territory and its conditions (Jabei Ameli, 1386: 6/385; Tusi, 1387: 8/167). 
Some other jurists are opposed to this view in general and some are opposed to the so-called 
crimes of God. According to the opponents, the permission to cite personal knowledge provides 
the basis for issuing a verdict based on the air of the soul and puts the ruler in suspicion of 
accusation (Ibn Qadameh, BT: 9/53; Ibn Rushd, 145: 2 / 392) It has also been said that the judge's 
knowledge is sensory knowledge and cannot be presented as evidence to the litigant, and therefore 
the right to dispute is taken away from the person against whom the evidence is against. In the 
event of a dispute, the judge will be reduced to one party (Sanhori, 1952: 2/27), and this is a gross 
violation of the rules of procedure. On the other hand, it can be said that the impermissibility of 
judging a judge based on his knowledge is one of the branches of the rule of "al-bina al-al-madai". 
The requirement of this rule is that the task of proof is always the responsibility of the plaintiff, 
not the judge and others. However, a promise based on the knowledge of a judge has a stronger 
argument and a more logical justification. If confession, testimony, and oath were matters of 
worship and confinement, the issuance of a sentence was not permissible except on the basis of 
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them; But these reasons are merely the means and ways of discovering the truth and creating 
knowledge in the judge. His knowledge is the criterion for knowing the truth and is stronger than 
the testimony that is useful for suspicion (Shokani, 1255: 8/289). If the judge's reliance on his 
knowledge in issuing a verdict causes slander and suspicion, accepting the evidence of the 
plaintiff or the oath will also be subject to the same slander (Alam al-Huda, 1415: 493). In a 
rational analysis, as Abul Salah Halabi has said, the correctness of the verdict based on confession, 
evidence and oath is a branch of obtaining knowledge on their validity; If the judge's knowledge 
is invalid, the issuance of a verdict based on other evidences will not be valid (Halabi, 1403: 
3/420). This statement is based on the assumption that the arguments have no intrinsic validity, 
but their validity depends on the judge's assurance of their accuracy and authenticity (Mohaghegh 
Hali, 1411: 3/543). In any case, the science that the judge can rely on is scientific (Shokani, 1255: 
9/197). Therefore, with the realization of the judge's knowledge, which is accompanied by 
expressions of confidence, no other evidence is needed for the litigation chapter and it suffices 
that knowledge is sufficient to issue a verdict and makes it unnecessary from other evidences 
(Dadashi and Feyz, 1395: 109). It seems that the ruling of Article 211 of the Islamic Penal Code, 
which stipulates that "the knowledge of a judge is the certainty obtained from the documents in 
the matter before him", has the same meaning. 
In Iranian criminal law, the judge's knowledge has been declared valid as one of the proofs of the 
claim in general and the reason for proving the crime in particular. Among other things, the 
Islamic Penal Code adopted in 2013 mentions the knowledge of the judge as one of the ways to 
prove a crime. Article 160 of this law states that "the evidence of a crime is confession, testimony, 
oath and oath in cases prescribed by law and the knowledge of the judge" as well as in accordance 
with Article 161 "in cases where criminal litigation with religious evidence such as confession 
and testimony "It is proven that the judge will issue a verdict based on them, unless he has the 
knowledge to the contrary." 160 and 161 and their jurisprudential origin - it can be concluded that 
the knowledge of the judge can be cited both in the right of God and in the right of the people. 
According to the definition according to Article 211 of the Islamic Penal Code, "the knowledge 
of the judge is the phrase Certainty is the result of Bin's documents in what is presented to him. 
"By studying such a science in accordance with the second part of the mentioned article, and as 
the following note indicates, there are evidences and emirates that typically lead to certainty, such 
as Expert Theory, Site Inspection, Local Investigations, Informed Statements, Officers' Reports 
and Other Evidence and Emirates that are typically scientific. The knowledge of the judge is 
relevant as defined in the Islamic Penal Code and according to Article 212 of the same law, in 
case of conflict, it takes precedence over other arguments. In addition, by order of Article 362 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court, in addition to the evidence contained in the indictment 
or the evidence cited by the parties and other evidence and statistics in the case, conducts any 
investigation necessary to discover the truth. These two legal provisions state the authenticity and 
subjectivity of the judge's knowledge and its precedence over other evidence of the crime. 
The right of ijtihad for judges 
During the Rashidun caliphate, the separation between the executive ruler and the judiciary in the 
Islamic government was one of the basic principles of the Islamic system. As many Islamic judges 
stipulated with the caliphs of their time that they would accept the position of judge if their 
freedom and independence were preserved and no factor other than right and justice interfered in 
their work. In the early days of Islam, rulers and caliphs observed their limits in the independence 
 Examining the authority and authority of judges in terms of independence, science and ijtihad in 
jurisprudence and law 
 
Propósitos y Representaciones 
            Jan. 2021, Vol. 9, SPE(1), e937 
  http://dx.doi.org/10.20511/pyr2021.v9nSPE1.937              
 
of the judge. In many cases there was a difference of opinion between the judge and the caliph; 
Nevertheless, the caliph expressed only his opinion and refused to exercise political will on the 
judge. The second caliph met a man during his caliphate and said to him: Are we industry? (What 
did you do?) And the man said: Ali (AS) and Zayd (RA) judged me with such a verdict, Omar 
said: If you were Anna, you would judge me (if I were you, I would judge with another verdict). 
The man said: There is no obstacle, you are the ruler. Omar said: If you are a duck to the Book of 
God and to the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), do not act and do not understand to a common 
opinion and opinion. (If I had referred you to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, I would 
have done so, but now I will turn you back to my own opinion and ijtihad, and that (right of 
ijtihad) is common among all mujtahids (Shahabi, 1372: 82). 
The caliph did not invalidate the verdicts of Ali (AS) and Zayd (RA) here, although he was 
opposed to their ijtihad in judgment. On the other hand, one of the characteristics of a Muslim 
judge is his release from the confines of his soul, material and sexual prisons, and dangerous 
worldly attractions. Finally, it must be acknowledged that in Islam, after the establishment of the 
principle of the independence of the judge and the determination of a sufficient pension for judges, 
the judge is expected to perform his duties of justice and righteousness properly. For this reason, 
another principle must be added to the previous principles, and that is that the Islamic government 
is obliged to monitor the judicial independence and the smooth running of the verdict in favor of 
the right. In Islam, the principle is to conduct a thorough inspection and thorough investigation of 
matters belonging to the judiciary and its good conduct; That is, there should be continuous 
monitoring of the smooth running of the judiciary. All of this oversight is to ensure that the judge 
is able to restore the right, and that the judge does not exercise his or her taste in adjudicating the 
case, depending on his or her right to independence. 
 
Evidence for the necessity of ijtihad of judges 
Most jurists believe in the necessity of ijtihad in judging and emphasize this very much. A group 
of them such as Sheikh Tusi (Bita: 337), Allameh Hali (1422: 5/110), Mohaghegh Hali (1409: 
4/860), Martyr Thani (1418: 13/327), Mohaqeq Hali (1410: 271), Shahid Mofid (1410: 721), Ibn 
Idris (1410: 2/154), Ibn Hamza Tusi (1408: 208), Al-Faqani (1418: 276) , Khorasani Sabzevari 
(1423: 2/660), Hali (1389: 4/298), Halabi (1417: 436) have acknowledged the necessity of 
knowledge for the judge, but in the description of this adjective or the principles of ijtihad and 
what is necessary to achieve ijtihad They have not paid or acted according to the fatwas of other 
scholars. In this regard, Imam Khomeini (ra) and another group of jurists have explicitly 
mentioned the condition of ijtihad and having the ability (Khomeini, 1390: 2/407; Tabatabai 
Yazdi, 1423: 6/418; Ameli, 1410: 3/67 The mentioned jurists have presented several arguments 
to prove their opinion, which we will express. 
Narrations: The first is the accepted narration of Umar ibn Hanzala, one of the strongest 
arguments that has been presented to the judge for the condition of ijtihad; Which we will discuss 
in the following: 
Muhammad ibn Ya`qub on the authority of Muhammad ibn Yahya on the authority of Muhammad 
ibn al-Husayn on the authority of Muhammad ibn Isa on the authority of Safwan ibn Yahya on 
the authority of Dawood ibn al-Husayn on the authority of Umar ibn Hanzalah: Salat al-Aba 
Abdullah (AS) on the authority of his companions among them, quarreled in religion and 
inheritance. Judgment is the place for you? He said, "I will rule over them in their right and wrong, 
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then I will rule over the idolatrous, and we will rule over it, and I will take it, and if it is true, I 
will firmly take it from the ruler, and we will command God Almighty to say to God Almighty:" 
Would you like to be led to the tyrant? One of them said to you (women): Fakif Yasnaan said, "I 
am the one who said, 'I do not think so. On the other hand, God forbid, and he is on the limit of 
polytheism, by God, he said: If there is a whole unit of free will, men from our companions, 
suppose that they are the observers in our deception and disagree in our wisdom and their hats 
differ in your hadith? He said: The ruling is firm on their justice and their affection and their alms 
in the hadith and their traditions and ... » 
The narrator says that I asked Hazrat Sadegh (AS) about two Shiites who had a dispute over debt 
or inheritance, whether they were allowed to sue the Sultan of the time or the judges of the ruling 
system. Imam (AS) said in this regard: Whoever pleads with them and takes a lawsuit to them, 
whether he has a right or not, has sued the Taghut and whatever is ruled in his favor and the money 
that is It is filthy, even if he is right, because he has taken this property based on the ruling of 
Taghut, while God has commanded you to disbelieve in Taghut. The narrator says: I said, then 
what should the two do? Imam (AS) said: Let them see who among you is the narrator of the 
hadith and who has commented on what is lawful and what is unlawful for us and knows our 
rules, so let them be satisfied that he is the arbiter, so I have made him the ruler over you and also 
signed Hazrat Hojjat (AS) is the one who said: And as for the events of the event, they will return 
to the narration of our hadith, then they are Hojjati to you and I am Hojjatullah (Har Ameli, 1397: 
18/98). In this hadith, there are three important interpretations of "Nazar Fi Halalna", "Arf 
Ahkamna" and "Fiqh" that are applicable to ijtihad, which are described below: In the 
interpretation of "Nazar Fi Halalna", the word Nazar is interpreted. It is on a person who has been 
appointed by the Infallible Imam (AS) and must be a person of opinion, and opinion also means 
thought and reflection, and is not in the imitation of this thought and reflection. 
Some elders believe that ijtihad is a condition of judgment, but ruled out the use of the word 
"opinion" in the condition of ijtihad, including the late Mohaghegh Ashtiani, who states in this 
regard: The meaning of ijtihad (Ashtiani, 1369: 11). In the interpretation of "the custom of our 
rules", custom has been considered as the meaning of science, as it is stated in Mesbah al-Munir 
that the knowledge of knowledge (Fayumi, 1401: 3/98) and in the words of Ragheb: the 
perception of something by thought (Ragheb, 1409 : 4/248). In the interpretation of jurisprudence, 
it is stated that: Our ruling is a ruling on their justice and their jurisprudence (Har Ameli, 1412: 
27/205) It is important here that a jurist in Wright does not only mean a mujtahid and a non-
mujtahid can also be a jurist ( Naraghi, 1408: 17/25). 
As it is clear from this article, none of these interpretations can be a condition of ijtihad for a 
judge unless it is assumed that the person appointed by the Infallible Imam (as) is a mujtahid; 
Because in this narration, the narrator of the hadiths of the Ahl al-Bayt and the one who knows 
what is lawful and what is lawful and their rules have been appointed as "rulers and judges" over 
the ummah. Is a mujtahid (Ansari, 1415: 29; Sabzevari, Bita: 261) It should be noted that some 
of them do not accept the assignment of the position of judge to the absolute mujtahid (Ansari, 
1415: 30). 
The second narration of the news of Abi Khadijeh is: "Muhammad ibn al-Hasan wrote documents 
... On the authority of Abi Khadijeh, he said: Abu Abdullah (AS) sent to his companions and said 
to them, 'If you stand between your adversary or it is dark in what you take and give.' One of the 
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hypocrites, do what is lawful and unlawful for us, men, and we are mortal, for you have made me 
a judge, and I will take some of you to some of them to Sultan al-Ja'ir. "The narrator says: Imam 
Sadegh (AS) said to me: Do not pray for some of you to pray. Match but look at someone of yours 
who knows something about our knowledge; So put him among you, a judge, so I made him a 
judge, so sue him (Har Ameli, 1397: 18/100; Klini, 1363: 7/412) 
 The reasoning for this narration is similar to the previous narration, and it is believed that the one 
who knows the teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt (AS) has been appointed as a judge. Because he is 
the only mujtahid who has knowledge of the rules (Khomeini, 1418: 6/35; Hali, 1413: 2/180). 
The third is the narration of Imam Sadegh (AS) who said: Judges are of four groups, three of 
which are in the fire: the first group is the one who judges with knowledge that he is in the fire 
and the other is the one who knows unknowingly and out of ignorance. He judges with cruelty 
that he too is on fire. The third group is the one who rules, although he rules rightly, but out of 
ignorance and ignorance, and finally, the fourth group is those who judge scientifically while 
ruling rightly; That this group is in heaven (Har Ameli, 1397: 11/18). Accordingly, the judges of 
Hell are not the only ones who rule with knowledge, justice and fairness; But there are three other 
groups in the fire. The statement of the jurists who believe in the necessity of ijtihad of the judge, 
referring to the previous narration, is that science based on imitation is not actually science 
because the imitator who rules according to the fatwa of the mujtahid does not know it. ; But the 
mujtahid who acts according to his inference and rules according to it as a judge, in fact, inferred 
the ruling from the main evidences and sources and considers it as the ruling of God (Ansari, 
1415: 36). 
Consensus 
Another reason that has been relied on in order to prove the necessity of the judge's ijtihad is 
consensus and non-contradiction (Tusi, 1411: 6/208; Shahid Thani, 1419: 2/283; Ansari, 1415: 
33). Ibn Zohreh writes in this regard: "It is obligatory for the custodian of justice to be wise in the 
truth in the ruling of the rejected due to the consensus of the sect and also the guardian of the dead 
knows that it is ugly rationally and does not allow chapters." It is obligatory for the one who has 
taken charge of justice to know the truth. The ruling given to him was due to the consensus of the 
tribe. Also, it is intellectually disgusting to undertake a task that one is not aware of, and it is not 
permissible for such a person to be hostile. Shahid Thani claims the consensus of the scholars 
regarding the condition of ijtihad in the judge and goes on to say: The judge must be an absolute 
mujtahid. In order to be able to occupy the position of judiciary and be hostile (Ameli, 1413: 165) 
jurists such as Shahid Thani, Sahib Riyadh (Tabatabai, 1419: 138) and Ashtiani (Ashtiani, 1369: 
3) believe that in addition to verses and hadiths of consensus Indicates the validity of ijtihad in 
the judge. In this regard, Sahib Jawahir says: There is no consensus that the jurists have claimed 
that such a consensus does not exist, but it has been proven against us, especially with the 
emergence of evidence in the validity of the condition of knowledge in the judge that there is no 
reason for ijtihad in the judge (Najafi, 1412 : 40); So such a consensus is not valid in our view 
because it is a valid consensus that the discoverer of The word of the Infallible (AS). Sheikh Tusi 
in contrast (Tusi, 1407: 2087) have the interpretation of sectarian consensus, the second martyr 
in Masalak (Ameli, 1413: 13/329) Ibn Zohreh in Ghaniyeh (Ibn Zohreh, 1411: 437), Feyz Kashani 
in Mafatih (Feyz Kashani, 1412: 3/236) have claimed consensus and also the Indian genius in the 
discovery of the third (Indian genius, 1406: 10/7) have claimed consensus; But among the latter, 
this consensus has not received much attention. For example, in the case of the owner of the jewel, 
who is very committed to consensus, but in this regard, they have said: But the claim of consensus, 
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which was heard by the film, was stopped, but because the researcher was against it (Najafi, 1412: 
40). In addition, Sheikh Mofid has mentioned a series of characteristics for the judge that these 
characteristics apply only to the mujtahid. Of course, he did not mention the word ijtihad, he said: 
"I do not believe in myself, and I do not believe in any of them, even if I do not even believe in 
it, I am completely knowledgeable in the book, and the copy, and the abrogated, the public, the 
private, the deposit, the answer, the court, and the similar mystics." Useful, 1398: 720). 
Sheikh Tusi, after Sheikh Mofid, have taken the same phrases from Sheikh Mofid. (Tusi, 1407: 
337) Ibn Braj has also stated the attributes of a judge as follows: Judgment is not a contract for a 
judge except for one who is one of the people of knowledge, justice and perfection, and who is a 
scholar who is a mystic by the book, the Sunnah, the congregation, the differences and the 
language of the Arabs ... The book in the tariff on the knowledge of the good, the general, the 
special, the strong, the similar, the commentator, the absolute, the abrogator, the abrogator and 
the abrogated (Hali, 1404: 2/597) Judges have deemed it necessary and these descriptions are not 
applicable to the imitator. 
Grateful 
Another reason given by some jurists, including the late Khoei, for the condition of ijtihad is that 
the condition of ijtihad falls within the realm of the pious, so according to the principle of no 
personal guardianship over another person, only the mujtahid has his ruling valid and no other 
ruling is valid. Because the principle of justice is a necessary thing, otherwise the waste of rights, 
chaos and the destruction of the system of life will be necessary. Therefore, it is necessary that 
the Imams (AS) have given permission in Qada, but there has been no statement as to who has 
been given permission by the Infallible (AS). As a result, a matter is established between a 
mujtahid and a non-mujtahid, in which case the permission of the mujtahid is final and it is 
doubtful that the principle of non-guardianship of one over another will prevail. This principle of 
the mujtahid goes beyond the general but the non-mujtahid under this It remains public and as a 
result the non-mujtahid judgment will not be valid. Of course, the title of proof is the value of the 
pious due to negligence because it is like a practical principle and its validity is in the absence of 
reason such as verse, narration, consensus and so on. In other words, the issue under discussion, 
that is, the condition of ijtihad, is about the period between the matter of determination and 
change, and in the sense that the holy shari'ah must have given permission to the time of absence, 
and due to its importance, has not neglected this issue. But there are two possibilities as to who 
has been given permission; The first is that it is only given to the mujtahids in terms of other 
conditions such as justice, etc., and the second is that the mujtahids are not allowed in terms of 
other conditions, of course. If the shari'ah has given general and general permission, that is, both 
the mujtahid and others are authorized, then the mujtahids are authorized, and if the shari'ah has 
not given general permission and has given permission only to certain people, then it is not 
possible to give permission to a non-mujtahid, but Has not given permission to the mujtahid and 
has considered ijtihad as an obstacle to qada, so it is clear that in this case, too, it is the mujtahid 
who will be authorized, that is, in any case, it is the mujtahid who is authorized to refer to this 
type of interpretation. The pious person is a mujtahid. In this regard, the late Khoei, after entering 
into the narrations as evidence and evidence, went to the value of the pious and considered ijtihad 
as a condition and placed the mujtahid in the range of the value of the pious and accepted Velayat-
e-Faqih with this principle (Tabatabai Yazdi, 1999). : 6/415). 
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No need for ijtihad in judgment 
Some jurists, without using the term ijtihad or jurisprudence, have contented themselves with 
stating that the judge needs to be a scholar. This means that he must be familiar with books, 
traditions and words. These expressions are mostly seen in the words of earlier jurists (Mufid, 
1413: 720; Ibn Hamza, 1408: 207; Ibn Idris, 1410: 155). The late Naraghi pays special attention 
to this matter and says: The words of most of the ancients are empty of mentioning the mujtahid 
or its synonym (Naraghi, 1415: 25). Some have explicitly considered ijtihad as a condition in the 
judge and have given their statement in absolute terms (Hali, 1420: 5/110; Mohaqeq Hali, 1408: 
60) and on this point of view, consensus has been claimed (Shahid Thani, 1413: 328; Yazdi, 1409 
: 6). Some, such as the first martyr and Ayatollah Khoei, did not consider the consolidation of 
ijtihad in the consolidation judge as a condition by separating the appointed judge from the judge 
(Shahid Thani, 1410: 68; Khoei, 1407: 13). Others do not consider ijtihad as an absolute condition 
and the criterion in their opinion is that the ruling is right and just and based on the rules of the 
Ahl al-Bayt, even if the judge is not a mujtahid (Najafi, 1981: 40; Muqaddas Ardabili, 1414: 19; 
Ardabili, 1423: 130) . Proponents of her case have been working to make the actual transcript of 
this statement available online. 
Among the arguments cited by this group are the narrations that have been proposed about the 
chapter of hostility, such as the narration of Halabi (Har Ameli, 1409: 27). In this narration, the 
phrase "Fitrazians of the tower of Mina" is mentioned and approved by the Imam, and 
jurisprudence is not mentioned in it. Therefore, the emergence of the narration in the absence of 
a jurist, the man in question, is clear Because if he was one of the Shiite jurists, Halabi's question 
would be asked and it was clear that referring to him is not referring to Taghut and it is unlikely 
that Halabi's character would have asked such a question. Another narration that has been cited is 
the narration of Abu Khadijeh, who says: Imam Sadegh (AS) sent me to the Shiites and said to 
them: Tell them: Whenever there is enmity between you or a dispute arises between you, do not 
go to these transgressors for trial, but Make a man among you a judge who knows our lawful and 
unlawful rulings, then I have made him a judge over you (Har Ameli, 1409: 27). This hadith is 
also considered valid from the point of view of the document (Momen, Bita: 64). In this hadith, 
Imam (AS) said about a worthy judge: "The custom of lawful and unlawful", which includes a 
non-mujtahid who knows what is lawful and unlawful by imitating a mujtahid, and Imam (AS) 
has considered his judgment and judgment to be correct. In addition, some jurists consider it 
permissible to judge the imitator absolutely, that is, both in times of discretion and in times of 
urgency. However, in his opinion, in order to be in this position, the imitator must have the 
permission of a comprehensive mujtahid who, according to the texts and consensus, is considered 
the successor and deputy of the Imams, otherwise his judgment will not be permissible. Among 
the jurists who have acknowledged this matter, we can mention Sahib Jawaher (15/40), Seyyed 
Abdul Karim Mousavi (1408: 89), Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Shirazi (1401: 1/22) and 
Mohammad Hassan Haeri Yazdi (73). 
The subject of ijtihad of judges in the current judicial system 
In the current judicial system and according to the constitution, the judge is obliged to issue 
judicial rulings and rulings according to the law and based on it, and if he does not find the ruling 
of the lawsuit in the laws, even if he is a mujtahid, he cannot issue the ruling according to his 
fatwa. Article 167 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates that: The judge is 
obliged to try to find the verdict of any lawsuit in the codified laws and if he does not find it, he 
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can issue the verdict based on valid Islamic sources or fatwas and cannot use it as an excuse. 
Silence or defect or conciseness or conflict of laws refuses to hear the case and issue a verdict. 
As it turns out, the legislator did not give the judge the right to act on his fatwa if he was a 
mujtahid, even if he did not find a ruling in the laws. However, in cases where the judge is a 
mujtahid and considers the law to be against the Shari'a, he is given the right to refuse to hear the 
case in that case so that the case can be referred to another branch of the court. 
Accordingly, Article 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the General and Revolutionary Courts 
in Civil Matters and its Note stipulate that: Judges of the courts are obliged, in accordance with 
the law, to hear cases, issue an appropriate verdict or a chapter on hostilities. If the laws in 
question are not complete or explicit or are contradictory or there is no law in the case at all, based 
on valid Islamic sources or valid fatwas and legal principles that are not contrary to Islamic law, 
they can issue a verdict and can not use it as an excuse. Silence or defect or conciseness or conflict 
of laws, refuse to hear the case and issue a verdict, otherwise they will be deprived of the 
realization of the recognized right and will be sentenced to punishment. 
And in its note, it is stated that if the judge is a mujtahid and considers the law to be against the 
Shari'a, the case will be referred to another branch for consideration. In fact, this article, and 
especially its commentary, prevents the issuance of a judicial verdict in accordance with the fatwa 
of the Mujtahid judge, and the judge cannot issue a verdict in accordance with his ijtihad opinion 
and fatwa, assuming that the law, considering his fatwa, is unlawful. Slow; Rather, he is given 
only the right to refuse to hear the case until another branch of the court hears the case and issues 
a verdict in accordance with the law, and in the absence of a verdict in the laws, he can only refer 
to authentic Islamic sources or valid fatwas. And refer to legal principles that are not contrary to 
the Shari'a and issue a ruling based on them. 
The judge can make his own inferences within the limits of codified laws, conflict resolution, 
summarizing laws and his interpretation of the text of the law, provided that in that case, a 
unanimous decision has not been issued. According to Article 161 of the Constitution, this task is 
the responsibility of the Supreme Court. It is a country, otherwise it will be obliged to follow the 
unanimous decision of the procedure issued by the Supreme Court. 
Also, according to Article 173, the interpretation and interpretation of ordinary laws is within the 
competence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The provisions of this principle do not 
preclude the interpretation that judges make of the law as a pure right. In addition, Article 170 of 
the Constitution provides: Judges of the courts are obliged to refrain from enforcing government 
decrees and regulations that are contrary to Islamic laws and regulations or outside the powers of 
the executive branch, and anyone can revoke such provisions from the Court of Administrative 
Justice. To request that in order to recognize such a thing and based on the evidence and texts, the 
judge must be familiar with the principles, rules and foundations of the Islamic legal and judicial 
system in order to be expected to do so. Therefore, while believing in the theory of non-necessity, 
we believe that non-mujtahid judges should also have a relative mastery of jurisprudence and the 
principles of Islamic law. Article 163 of the Constitution stipulates that: The attributes and 
conditions of a judge shall be determined by law in accordance with jurisprudential standards. In 
the implementation of this principle, paragraph 5 of the single article of the law stipulates the 
conditions for the election of judges of justice: "... having ijtihad or permission to judge ..." and 
to those who have a law degree or theology degree in jurisprudence and the principles of Islamic 
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law or students After completing the level, they have spent two years outside of jurisprudence 
and jurisprudence and have been allowed to volunteer for this position; Therefore, in the current 
laws and procedures of the country's judiciary, the mujtahid is practically an evil judge It is not 
considered necessary to hold the position of judge. 
Conclusion  
Jurisprudential and legal review of judges' independence 
One of the basic principles of judgment in Islam is the well-known principle of judicial 
independence, which is also referred to as the foundation and main concept of justice. In some 
verses of the Holy Quran, such as verse 135 of Surah An-Nisa ', judicial independence is 
mentioned, which indicates the importance of this vital principle; One of the important conditions 
of judicial independence is the independence of the judge, and personal independence in this study 
means the release of the judge from any pressure. Freedom of the judge from external pressures 
means independence from relatives, friends, litigants, those in power, public opinion, colleagues 
and those who run the judiciary. And the purpose of judicial independence is for the judge to use 
the law as a criterion for ruling and not to pay attention to the orders and influence of his superiors, 
and in addition that others should not remove him from office, demote him or change his place of 
service. On the other hand, they should not be afraid of these things. This means that these matters 
should not affect him. It is also clear that judicial independence, like other legal institutions, 
follows the general goal of law, namely the administration of justice on the basis of order, and is 
also a scene of conflict between order and justice because most violators of this principle are the 
providers of social order and under the pretext of independence. They are attacking the judiciary. 
The principle of judicial independence is one of the most important legal principles regarding 
judging, which can be understood with a little care in its meaning and basis, in addition to 
providing two main goals of order and justice in law; In particular, it has three other important 
benefits: protecting the rights of society; Ensuring the rights of the judiciary and guaranteeing 
individual rights. However, a review of the legislative background and its developments in Iran 
shows that despite the importance of the independence of the judge in the conduct of a fair trial, 
not only has not been properly considered, but in the legislative process has always seen the 
expansion of authority. We are government agencies with different titles in order to limit the 
independence of judges. It seems that the laws and regulations related to judges from the 
perspective of employment and promotion and promotion, job security, how to prosecute and 
investigate violations, accreditation to vote, interpretation and opinion of the judge, in order to 
guarantee and Respect for the independence of the judge needs to be reconsidered and reformed, 
and without addressing this issue, it is not possible to talk about the independence of the judge in 
its true sense. It's worthy; The legislator should try to improve the principles of independence and 
neutrality quantitatively and qualitatively and should observe these principles. On the other hand, 
it is expected that the legislator, by passing comprehensive and preventive laws, in addition to 
guaranteeing the proportionate execution of the crime, will act against the right of the judge, 
which is contrary to the principle of impartiality, and from advising and influencing judicial 
officers. And to prevent an administration that violates the principle of judicial independence. In 
general, the legal system of our country suffers from weaknesses and shortcomings both in terms 
of structure and in terms of principles and procedures; In a way that the independence and 
impartiality of the judge is seriously questioned. Therefore, in order to complete and develop the 
judicial justice system as much as possible, it is proposed to create independent and impartial 
courts in order to ensure the principle of equality of arms while accepting the supervision of 
judges and the punishment of the offending judge. 
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Jurisprudential and legal study of the science of judges 
Evidence of crime is one of the most important issues in criminal law and criminal procedure. 
Prior to the enactment of the Islamic Penal Code in 1392, the issues related to this issue were 
inconsistently mentioned in the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact, the 
former legislature did not consider an independent law on proof in criminal matters. Rather, the 
issues related to proof were expressed in a scattered and incoherent manner in the Islamic Penal 
Code of 1991 and the Code of Criminal Procedure. And this issue caused various disagreements 
about the system of probative reasons accepted by the legislator, how to decide if there is a conflict 
between different arguments, the meaning of the judge's knowledge and so on. With the approval 
of the Islamic Penal Code in 2013 and the allocation of a separate part of this law to the evidence, 
many of the mentioned problems were solved and effective measures have been taken by the 
criminal legislator. In particular with regard to the knowledge of the judge, which is the subject 
of the present study, the measures taken by the legislature have covered many of the past 
ambiguities. Thus, from the content of the articles regulated in this regard, it can be clearly 
understood that the legislator does not mean science as a definite logical science, but as a science 
derived from the reasons, documents and documents in the criminal case. Evidence in criminal 
matters, the fifth part of the first book of this law, which itself consists of five chapters, is 
dedicated to evidence in criminal matters and the legislator in this section discusses the most 
important evidence and rules governing their presentation and application in criminal authorities. 
And has removed the confusion of judges that they have previously encountered in the discussion 
of evidence. Another issue that can be considered specifically in the discussion of judge science 
as an innovative approach to solving the existing problems in this field is the concept that the 
criminal legislator has presented of judge science. The legislator stipulates in Article 131 of the 
Islamic Penal Code of 1392 that "the knowledge of a judge is the certainty obtained from the 
documents in the matter that is presented to him." In cases where the document of the verdict is 
the knowledge of the judge, he is obliged to correctly state the evidence and the UAE between 
the document of his knowledge in the verdict. ”As is clear from this definition, the legislator 
addresses the existing disputes over the meaning of science. Judge is personal knowledge or end 
knowledge اده است  . Because in Article 211, he explicitly considers the meaning of knowledge to 
be the certainty obtained from the documents in the matter before him, and the knowledge 
obtained from the documents can not be the personal knowledge of the judge of the case. In 
addition, in the following part of this article, the criminal legislator has obliged the judge to 
explicitly state the evidence and the UAE between the document of his knowledge, and of course 
the evidence and the UAE can not only contain the personal observations or hearings of the judge. 
Be. In addition, the commentary on Article 211 can be cited. The legislator has been trying to 
explain his meaning of the documents and has stated that "items such as expert theory, site 
inspection, local investigations, informed statements, officers' reports and other evidence "And 
the UAE, which is typically knowledgeable, can be documented as a judge." Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the meaning of the documents between is the cases that can be included in the 
criminal case and can be reviewed by higher authorities. It seems that accepting this opinion and 
invalidating the personal knowledge of judges is more compatible with the criteria of a fair trial 
and the necessities related to the defense rights of the defendants, and will especially provide the 
basis for documenting the knowledge of judges at higher stages of criminal proceedings. 
Therefore, citing personal knowledge is not allowed for the judge of the court. The judge's 
personal knowledge refers to his personal information and information that he has obtained 
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outside the contents of the case and has no appearance in the case file and the evidence presented 
in court. Judge's knowledge is one of the topics of controversy among jurisprudence and law 
experts. What we have reached about the nature of the judge's knowledge in this study is that the 
expressions in Articles 211 and 212 of the Islamic Penal Code of 1392 indicate that from the 
legislative point of view, what is the basis for producing knowledge for the judge is evidence and 
the UAE typically The science is the result of judicial research. 
Jurisprudential and legal study of judges' ijtihad 
The matter of jurisprudence in religious texts is considered very serious and originally considered 
as one of the characteristics of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) or the guardian of the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH). Ijtihad in judges is an undeniable virtue and non-mujtahid judges must be familiar with 
the jurisprudence and rules of Islam, which is the basis and support of the judicial system and 
current laws, and be able to adapt to current examples and deduce from the law to an acceptable 
level. Have the authority to hold this serious position. He has been widely criticized for holding 
incompetent people in charge of this position (Nahj al-Balaghah, 17); But during the absence of 
Imam al-Asr (as) when society is inevitably a judge, this duty has been entrusted by the Imam to 
the scholars and the teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt and has been generally delegated to them (Har 
Ameli, 1397: 18). : 99). This has caused the Shiite jurists to consider "ijtihad" as a necessary 
condition and the jurisprudence as one of the affairs of the fatwas (Tabatabai, 1412: 2/385; Shahid 
Thani, 1419: 3/60; Salar, 1414) : 230;  ، 3/420: 1413حلی ). Most jurists believe in the necessity of 
ijtihad in judging and emphasize this very much. A group of them such as Sheikh Tusi (Bita: 337), 
Allameh Hali (1422: 5/110), Mohaghegh Hali (1409: 4/860), Martyr Thani (1418: 13/327), 
Mohaqeq Hali (1410: 271), Shahid Mofid (1410: 721), Ibn Idris (1410: 2/154), Ibn Hamza Tusi 
(1408: 208), Al-Faqani (1418: 276) , Khorasani Sabzevari (1423: 2/660), Hali (1389: 4/298), 
Halabi (1417: 436) have acknowledged the necessity of knowledge for the judge, but in the 
description of this adjective or the principles of ijtihad and what is necessary to achieve ijtihad 
They have not paid or acted according to the fatwas of other scholars. In this regard, Imam 
Khomeini (ra) and another group of jurists have explicitly mentioned the condition of ijtihad and 
having the ability (Khomeini, 1390: 2/407; Tabatabai Yazdi, 1423: 6/418; Ameli, 1410: 3/67 ). 
But from a legal point of view, Article 167 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
states that a judge is obliged to try to find the verdict of any lawsuit in the codified laws and if he 
does not find it, to issue a verdict based on valid Islamic sources or fatwas. He may not refuse to 
hear a case or issue a sentence under the pretext of silence or defect or brevity or conflict of laws. 
As it turns out, the legislator did not give the judge the right to act on his fatwa if he was a 
mujtahid, even if he did not find a ruling in the laws. However, in cases where the judge is a 
mujtahid and considers the law to be against the Shari'a, he has been given the right to refuse to 
hear the case so that the case can be referred to another branch of the court. Accordingly, Article 
3 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that the judges of the courts are obliged, in accordance 
with the law, to hear cases, issue appropriate judgments, or adjudicate hostilities. If the laws in 
question are not complete or explicit or are contradictory or there is no law in the case at all, based 
on valid Islamic sources or valid fatwas and legal principles that are not contrary to Islamic law, 
they can issue a verdict and can not use it as an excuse. Silence or defect or conciseness or conflict 
of laws, refuse to hear the case and issue a verdict, otherwise they will be deprived of the 
realization of the recognized right and will be sentenced to punishment. And in its note, it is stated 
that if the judge is a mujtahid and considers the law to be against the Shari'a, the case will be 
referred to another branch for consideration. As is clear from the context of Article 3 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure of the General and Revolutionary Courts in Civil Matters and its commentary, 
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this article, and in particular its commentary, prevents the issuance of a judicial verdict in 
accordance with the fatwa of the Mujtahid judge, and the judge cannot Considering his fatwa, he 
found it against the Shari'a, according to the ijtihad opinion and To issue a fatwa; Rather, he has 
only been given the right to refuse to hear the case so that another branch of the court can hear 
the case and issue a verdict in accordance with the law. In addition, Article 170 of the Constitution 
stipulates that judges of the courts are obliged to refrain from enforcing government decrees and 
regulations that are contrary to Islamic laws and regulations or outside the jurisdiction of the 
executive branch, and anyone can revoke such provisions from the Court of Justice. The 
administration should request that in order to determine such a matter and based on the evidence 
and texts, the judge must be familiar with the principles, rules and foundations of the Islamic legal 
and judicial system in order to be expected to do so. 
Therefore, while believing in the theory of non-necessity, we believe that non-mujtahid judges 
should also have a relative mastery of jurisprudence and the principles of Islamic law. Article 163 
of the Constitution stipulates that: The attributes and conditions of a judge shall be determined by 
law in accordance with jurisprudential standards. In the implementation of this principle, 
paragraph 5 of the single article of the law stipulates the conditions for the election of judges of 
justice: "... having ijtihad or permission to judge ..." and to those who have a law degree or 
theology degree in jurisprudence and the principles of Islamic law or students After completing 
the level, they have spent two years outside of jurisprudence and jurisprudence and have been 
allowed to volunteer for this position; Therefore, in the current laws and procedures of the 
judiciary of the country, the fact that a judge is a mujtahid has not been considered a necessary 
condition for holding the position of a judge. 
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